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the various translations of  Spinoza’s works offer often signifi-
cantly different interpretations of  the meaning of  his original Latin 
text. For this reason, the contributors have been free to choose their 
preferred translations or to translate themselves the Latin from the 
established text of  Spinoza’s works in the Gebhardt edition of  the 
Opera.
In references to the Ethics, the Roman numeral indicates the part 
of  the Ethics to which the author is referring, e.g., Ethics I is Ethics,








Pr. proof  
S scholium
For instance, Ethics II, P7, refers to Ethics, Part II, Proposition 7, and 
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the title of  this collection—Spinoza Now—highlights the im-
portance Spinoza places on the present moment for any political 
or cultural investigation. It also includes contributions that are of  
the present—attempts to think about, on, and with Spinoza in ad-
dressing contemporary issues and that are in response to current 
directions in Spinoza studies. I will address these two aspects of  the 
title in turn.
“For this much is quite certain, and proved to be true in our Eth-
ics, that men are necessarily subject to passions.” This statement, 
from Spinoza’s Political Treatise (1, §5), encapsulates the importance 
of  the present for his philosophy.1 Even though Spinoza insists on a 
knowledge from the perspective of  eternity or the infinite, communal 
living is nevertheless permeated with the affects each one feels while 
living. A desire is always in the present. Thus philosophy for Spinoza 
is inextricably linked to life, to the now of  existence.
Such a position is not a simple vitalism. The thought in Political 
Treatise that emphasizes the now may be better outlined in relation 
to what it opposes. Spinoza opens the Treatise by treating two op-
posing positions about human interaction: optimism and pessimism. 
The optimists are discussed in the first paragraph of  the Treatise.
They are those philosophers who look on the passions as vices to 
be avoided at all cost. “So it is their custom to deride, bewail, berate 
. . . or execrate” the passions. Thus they construct political theories 
that seek to eliminate affects. Spinoza is not simply skeptical about 
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such philosophizing because it “borders on fantasy or could be put 
into effect in Utopia”; he finds such theories so unfounded that they 
become amusing: “for the most part it is not ethics . . . but satire.” 
The optimist’s hope to suppress the present so as to imagine a future 
that has tamed the passions is entirely devoid of  practical significance.
The pessimists are discussed in the second paragraph of  the 
Treatise. They are those who are distrustful of  politicians. Because 
politicians know from experience “that there will be vices as long 
as there are men,” they fear people. This leads them to practices 
that may be construed as cunning or wicked, especially in the eyes 
of  “theologians, who believe that sovereign powers ought to deal 
with public affairs according to the same moral principles as are 
binding on the private individual.” However, this collapse of  the 
distinction between private and public is yet another unfounded 
fancy, one that is built on fear—not hope. If  past experience points 
to human vice, there is all the more reason to deal with that fear in 
contemporary political practice rather than seeking to repress it with
moralizing.
As Deleuze has emphasized, Spinoza cannot be understood as a 
moral philosopher, and this means that Spinoza is mindful of  the gap 
or break between false hope and crippling fear—between a utopian 
belief  in the future and a dread of  the past. Between them is located 
the now. At this space, ethics develops.
A brief  overview of  Spinoza’s reception is required to show 
the second aspect of  the title, namely, how Spinoza has emerged 
as a figure who allows us to think of  our contemporary situation.2
Rejection was the first significant reaction to Spinoza’s work.3 The 
seed for that reaction was already sown in 1670, when Spinoza’s 
Theologico-Political Treatise was published. The book contained a 
sustained argument against revealed religion by questioning, for 
example, the existence of  miracles. From that moment onward, 
Spinoza was painted as an atheist, and to be perceived as a follower 
of  Spinoza was indeed a dangerous position in which to find one-
self. Consequently, even after the Opera Posthuma were published 
shortly after Spinoza’s death in 1677, few actually read Spinoza’s 
works. To compound this, twenty years later Pierre Bayle wrote an 
article on Spinoza in the Dictionnaire historique et critique (1697) that 
interpreted Spinoza as collapsing the distinction between God and
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nature—a position that was understood to lead to Spinoza’s atheism. 
For years to come, the philosophical community would get their 
“Spinoza” from Bayle’s summary.
The identification of  God and nature received a name at the 
beginning of  the eighteenth century: pantheism. Spinoza was seen as 
recognizing God in everything, which only led to the inference that 
he identified God in nothing. At the same time, interpreting Spinoza 
as a vehement atheist attracted the attention of  those who were keen 
to challenge the superstitions of  religion and the authority of  the 
churches on revealed religion. Thus Spinoza was becoming aligned 
with Enlightenment, or at least with a polemical and combative 
strand of  Enlightenment, while at the same time the prominent 
figures of  the Enlightenment did not refer to Spinoza and distanced 
themselves from what they probably saw as opprobrious attacks on 
religion. This ambiguity erupted into the famous Pantheismusstreit,
or Pantheist Controversy, at the end of  the eighteenth century. 
Shortly after Lessing’s death, Jacobi contested in 1785 that Lessing 
had confessed to him that he was a Spinozist. Lessing was one of  the 
figureheads of  the Enlightenment in Germany as well as in Europe, 
and Jacobi’s claim amounted to an accusation that Enlightenment 
deified reason. As Frederick Beiser puts it, “the belief  in Spinoza’s 
cosmic God seemed to be the religion of  science itself.”4 In other 
words, Jacobi sought to argue that pantheism, or the identification of  
God with nature, was the position that any system that places reason 
over belief  is bound to adopt. When Lessing’s friend Mendelssohn, 
himself  a leading figure of  the Enlightenment, responded to Jacobi, 
suddenly Spinoza emerged as the métier of  the Enlightenment
project.
If  the Pantheist Controversy implicated luminaries of  the En-
lightenment and thereby exposed its limitations, Jacobi’s second 
public controversy involving Spinoza had a generative effect. This 
second controversy related to Fichte’s philosophy and unfolded in 
spring 1799.5 The transcendental idealist notion of  the subject had 
now become Jacobi’s target. Jacobi again argued that there are two 
options, this time articulated in terms of  subjectivity: either the 
subject is absolute, as Fichte argues, in which case the subject is 
deified, or there is space for belief  and the subject is not commen-
surate with reason. This controversy played a role in Fichte’s losing 
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his position at Jena University, where his students included Hegel 
and Schelling as well as Novalis, the Schlegels, and Hölderlin—or, 
in sum, the figures who would effect the transition to romanticism. 
Thus they were all exposed to Spinoza as the figure who unraveled 
their professor, Fichte. Paradoxically, their exposure to Spinoza led 
to a different interpretation of  pantheism, which was now seen 
as positive because it affirmed the importance of  nature or what 
they referred to as the particular. Novalis’s designation of  Spinoza 
as “God-intoxicated man,” or Hegel’s assertion that the whole of  
Spinoza can be read in relation to Proposition 7 of  Book II of  the 
Ethics (“the order and connection of  ideas is the same as the order 
and connection of  things”), should be understood in this context.6
The next couple generations of  philosophers exhibit a positive 
receptiveness of  Spinoza. For instance, Marx ranked Spinoza as 
one of  his formative influences, whereas Nietzsche saw in Spinoza 
his only genuine predecessor. Thus, whereas the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries viewed Spinoza with suspicion and hostility, 
in the nineteenth century Spinoza became the secret conversant of  
romanticism and its aftermath.
A crucial reason why Spinoza was never addressed in any thor-
ough fashion by the philosophers of  the nineteenth century was 
that there was not much scholarship on which they could build. This 
was rectified in the twentieth century, which saw an explosion of  
Spinoza scholarship. It started in the first decades of  the twentieth 
century with the voluminous works appearing mostly in Germany 
on the context of  Spinoza’s philosophy. In America, Harry Austryn 
Wolfson produced a remarkable account of  the sources of  Spinoza’s 
arguments,7 and more recently Yirmiyahu Yovel has provided an 
authoritative account both of  Spinoza’s context and its impact on 
subsequent philosophies.8 Alongside these works that concentrate 
on the external circumstances of  Spinoza’s thought, there is another 
side to this approach to Spinoza in the twentieth century, one that 
concentrates on the internal structure of  Spinoza’s argument and, 
in particular, on the Ethics. Perhaps the most prominent example 
here is Martial Guéroult’s Spinoza. The two volumes of  exegesis 
of  Part I and Part II of  the Ethics offer a close analysis of  the phi-
losophy that directed one toward grasping the architectonics of  the 
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book, that is, on presenting the structure or system of  the work as 
a whole.9 Edwin Curley has attempted something similar, although 
less voluminous, in America.10 In sum, this approach as a whole—in 
its concentration on both the external or contextual circumstances 
of  Spinoza’s philosophy and the internal structure of  his work—can 
be characterized as encyclopedic. The impact of  this encyclopedic 
approach has been that it established Spinoza as a topic of  study and 
disengaged the name “Spinoza” from both impassioned renuncia-
tions and their correlative, strategic appropriations.
Another approach to Spinoza emerged in the 1960s and can be 
characterized as an intensification of  the romantic fascination with 
Spinoza. If, in Novalis’s already quoted phrase, Spinoza was a “God-
intoxicated man” in the sense that he sought the universal in the 
particular, this focusing on the particular is now further elaborated, 
showing its implications for a philosophy of  power. The two instru-
mental figures in this new approach to Spinoza were Louis Althusser 
and Gilles Deleuze. Even though Althusser did not publish a lot on 
Spinoza, as Warren Montag has shown, his notion of  the structure is 
indebted to Spinoza’s notion of  the immanent cause, that is, a cause 
present only through its effects. Thus Spinoza gave the means to 
Althusser to evade a teleological or scientific Marxism that sought 
reality in an inexorable and analyzable chain of  causal relations of  
production. At roughly the same time, Deleuze’s book Expressionism 
in Philosophy argued that expression in Spinoza undoes traditional 
representationalism in philosophy. According to Deleuze, the ques-
tion that motivates Spinoza’s ethics is “what can a body do?”; that is, 
what kind of  relations produce and are produced by the individual?11
Althusser’s and Deleuze’s interpretations of  Spinoza inspired a 
subsequent generation of  scholars, such as their respective students 
Étienne Balibar and Antonio Negri.12 Warren Montag and Ted Stolze’s 
edited volume The New Spinoza, also published by the University of  
Minnesota Press, offers the best collection of  the rich range of  views 
of  this approach.13 We can summarize this approach by saying that it 
builds on the encyclopedic scholarship of  the previous approach to 
present Spinoza as a philosopher of  power, that is, as a philosopher 
who concentrates on immanence and particularity. In this sense, 
Spinoza is mobilized in the move against structures of  transcendence 
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and universalism—or what has come to be understood as modernity.
In the past few years, a new direction has started developing that 
could predominate in Spinoza studies in the twenty-first century. This 
approach assumes the centrality of  Spinoza’s thought in modernity—
not merely as a figure who leads to modernity but moreover as a figure 
whose thought is modern. Thus Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s 
influential critique of  modern sovereignty, Empire, is permeated with 
Spinoza’s influence.14 This is also evidenced by its sequel, Multitude,
because the title-term’s provenance is Spinoza’s Political Treatise.15
Even though Spinoza is not referred to continuously in these two 
works by Hardt and Negri, still the Spinozan insistence on immanence 
is utilized in understanding current issues. There are several other 
examples of  this approach. For instance, Moira Gatens and Genevieve 
Lloyd also use Spinoza’s philosophy to address philosophical and 
political issues of  the present in Collective Imaginings.16 In addition, 
works in neighboring disciplines, such as Antonio Damasio’s Looking 
for Spinoza, attempt a theoretical approach to neuropsychology based 
on Spinoza’s theory of  affects.17 This third direction characteristically 
uses Spinoza to think about issues related to the present. Spinoza’s 
thought participates in current debates. Maybe this new approach 
is philosophy’s way of  catching up with other practices, such as lit-
erature, which, at least since Alexander Pope and George Eliot, has 
seen Spinoza as a source of  inspiration.18 There are also important 
examples of  a Spinozan influence in the arts, notably the Spinoza 
Monument by Thomas Hirschhorn (Amsterdam, 1999). There Spinoza 
becomes a contemporary, a participant in cultural and intellectual 
production, the figure who allows us to think of  our modernity.
The encyclopedic approach to Spinoza that started at the begin-
ning of  the twentieth century is still valuable today because it provides 
a basis for further scholarship. The approach that presents Spinoza 
as a philosopher of  power and hence aligns him with modernity can 
be seen as setting the foundations of  the third approach: only after 
establishing Spinoza’s import for postmetaphysical thought would 
it have been possible to bring Spinoza to the now. Spinoza Now takes 
the challenges faced by this latter approach seriously. It includes as 
broad a variety of  approaches as possible. All the contributions ac-
tively engage with Spinoza, making his thought relevant today. The 
chapters seek to pursue Spinoza’s thought by thinking with Spinoza.
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The two aspects of  the title—Spinoza’s own emphasis on the now 
and the new approach in Spinoza studies emphasizing his present 
relevance—should be seen as interlaced. What characterizes them 
both is a dynamic conception of  production. For Spinoza, the past 
and the future are both productive of, and produced by, the present. 
The immutability of  the static substance is only a formal principle 
to guarantee the infinite unfolding of  being and thought. The new 
approach to Spinoza reproduces this dual direction of  production in 
explicating Spinoza. But in so doing, it is also producing a Spinoza 
of  the “now,” a Spinoza who participates as a productive force in 
cultural formation.
The first four chapters offer different ways of  understanding 
the reception of  Spinoza’s thought as well as forging new ways 
for thought through an understanding of  that reception history. In 
the opening chapter of  the volume, Christopher Norris conducts a 
critical overview of  the way Spinoza has been received by various 
philosophical traditions. Norris starts by observing the great con-
flict in the interpretation of  Spinoza, namely, that Spinoza has been 
viewed either as a mystic or as an atheist, either as a spiritualist or as 
a materialist. Tracing some aspects of  this variegated history, Nor-
ris argues that its latest incarnation is the divided interpretation of  
Spinoza between analytic and continental philosophers. Something 
unites the two approaches, however, namely, the thrust to overcome 
dualism, either in its Cartesian or Kantian manifestation. From that 
point of  view, Spinozan monism emerges as standing beyond the 
analytic–continental dichotomy. Norris does not argue that Spinoza 
bridges the gap between the two philosophical schools but rather that 
Spinoza’s metaphysics necessitates a rapprochement between analytic 
and continental philosophy that will be mutually beneficial.
Alain Badiou concurs with Christopher Norris about the conflict 
of  interpretation generated by Spinoza, and especially his Ethics, and 
proposes a solution to this problem. Departing from the observation 
that even though the Ethics are written more geometrico—in a geo-
metrical order—very little of  the literature on Spinoza has actually 
paid close attention to this mathematical methodology. Examining 
a single proposition—Ethics I, P28—Badiou shows that the way the 
proof  of  the proposition is related to previous propositions, defini-
tions, axioms, and so on, is indispensable in understanding the Ethics.
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The geometrical order creates a web of  relations that structure the 
Ethics. This mirrors Spinoza’s insistence in Definition 2, at the very 
beginning of  the Ethics, that the distinction between the infinite and 
the finite is strictly relational. The ratiocination and the order of  be-
ing are, therefore, correlated. Spinoza, argues Badiou, propounds a 
mathematics of  Being—an ontology according to which thinking 
or the intellect is action as such.
The implicit targets of  Badiou’s argument, according to which 
Spinoza’s theory of  relations can only be read in parallel with the 
mathematical nature of  proofs in the Ethics, are the attempts to read 
the theory of  relations through the theory of  passions. Simon Duffy 
discusses the two most prominent exponents—Gilles Deleuze and 
Pierre Macherey—in locating the theory of  relations in the third part 
of  the Ethics. By exploring Deleuze’s and Macherey’s different inter-
pretations of  the relation between active or joyful and passive or sad 
affections, Duffy shows two ways of  constructing a politics departing 
from the theory of  passions. Duffy concentrates on the elusive “joy-
ful passions,” which are neither properly active nor purely passive 
and therefore forge a relation between joyous and sad affections.
Is there a way of  mediating between the mathematical and the 
affective approach? Justin Clemens’s chapter, in locating the emer-
gence of  the political in in-action, and in showing that inaction is 
a matter of  the mathematics of  Being and of  affective disposition, 
suggests a possible mediation. This chapter presents a genealogy of  
the Buridan’s ass paradox (Ethics II, P49S)—the donkey that cannot 
decide between two equidistant bales of  hay. Clemens argues that 
the paradox has two ostensible targets: Descartes’s separation of  will 
and understanding and Hobbes’s exclusion from the covenant with 
the sovereign of  all those who cannot decide. As such, Buridan’s ass 
shows the tight connections between Spinoza’s ontology, epistemol-
ogy, and politics. From this perspective, argues Clemens, Buridan’s 
ass demonstrates Spinoza’s materialism.
All the different approaches explored in the first four chapters 
have one thing in common: the insistence that Spinoza’s ontology is 
linked to his politics. This insistence can take another, more special-
ized guise: the link between theology—broadly conceived to include 
any notion of  universalism—and the political. This link is possible 
because of  the process of  interpretation—the biblical exegesis that 
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Spinoza proposes in the Theologico-Political Treatise or the notion of  
expression in the Ethics that Deleuze emphasizes. The four chapters 
of  Part II deal with this theme.
Like Clemens, Michael Mack also addresses Descartes’s and 
Hobbes’s influence on Spinoza, but shows how it is possible to eschew 
an absolute universalism in favor of  an inclusive universalism. Mack 
shows that Spinoza is not arguing against religion or theology per 
se but rather against the politics of  domination to which Cartesian 
dualism of  necessity leads. The reason for this is that there is a line 
connecting theology with teleology and anthropomorphism, which 
only leads to the possibility of  one group claiming superiority and 
domination over another. Mack describes this as a self-destructive or 
autoimmune process. This is juxtaposed to the intellectual love of  
God from Ethics V, which Mack interprets as instating a communal-
ity, in the sense that it describes a plurality of  individual minds, an 
affirmation of  singularities. Only this communality, argues Mack, 
gives us a chance for a nonviolent politics.
Arthur J. Jacobson turns to the Theologico-Political Treatise to 
examine the status of  prophets. It is well known that for Spinoza, 
there are no miracles, and in this sense prophesy is part of  natural 
knowledge, its distinctive characteristic being that it helps in the 
formation of  community. Jacobson further complicates this standard 
account of  Spinoza’s prophets by pointing out a paradox, namely, 
that if  prophesy is natural knowledge, then everyone, in principle, 
even if  not in fact, can be a prophet. This structure, as Jacobson 
demonstrates, can also be found in Maimonides. The effect of  this 
structure in Spinoza is that knowledge, then, is shareable by every-
one—there is a democracy of  knowledge.
Warren Montag looks at scripture itself  to make a related point 
to that raised by Jacobson. Montag points out the correlation be-
tween ontology and politics expressed in “God, or Nature” from the
Ethics has its equivalent in the Theologico-Political Treatise, in which 
Spinoza writes, “Scripture, or the mind of  the Holy Spirit.” This in-
dicates that interpretation is also a partner in ontology and politics. 
But this is only possible, as Montag demonstrates, if  interpretation 
presupposes that any work does not exist prior to its effects. There 
is no independent space of  reason that remains outside a causality 
that includes the imagination and all the faults that characterize the 
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human’s mind and actions. This crucial Spinozan insight is missing, 
argues Montag, from Jonathan Israel’s image of  Spinoza as the prime 
representative of  “radical Enlightenment” that supposedly demysti-
fied knowledge, emptying it of  all superstition. Conversely, Montag 
shows that scripture is equivalent to the mind of  the Holy Spirit 
because it is the palimpsest of  the interaction, inevitably and invari-
ably at fault, of  imagination and reason. Furthermore, if  scripture, 
like Nature, is perfection, then the Bible is, paradoxically, no longer 
an exemplary or singular text but rather the manifestation of  inter-
pretation’s role in the interplay between ontology and politics. To 
recall the distinction about the prophets drawn by Arthur Jacobson, 
scripture, in principle, has no superiority over any other text; it is 
more important than other texts only in fact, through the influence 
it exercised in the conceptualization of  law and norm.
Like Montag, Cesare Casarino also departs from a close reading, 
in this case, a passage that refers to the “concatenation of  all things” 
(Ethics I, Ap.). Casarino first points out that Spinoza uses the notion 
of  concatenation to explicate the argument of  the first part of  the 
Ethics. Such an explication is rare, if  not unique, in the Ethics. Casa-
rino shows that this is not accidental. Concatenation is interlinked 
with Spinoza’s understanding of  interpretation that requires two 
simultaneous procedures: the positing of  a totality, on one hand, 
and, on the other, the signification and performance of  meaning. 
This dual aspect is precisely what Deleuze has termed expression or 
sense. But there is also a second, political consequence of  this move. 
Concatenation and the totality it implies present Spinoza as a genuine 
theorist of  globalization—the Ethics appears as a response to capital 
and its totalizing imperative. According to Casarino’s argument, the 
explication that signifies and performs its meaning is not commen-
surable with representation in the sense that it activates potentiality 
in the process of  interpretation: the knowledge of  an object is not 
subjective but a feature of  the object itself. This allows for singularity. 
As Marx showed, it is possible to think of  the ontological function 
of  God as absolute immanence. But in Spinoza, that absolute im-
manence is accompanied by the concatenation of  all beings, which 
retains being’s singularity. Thus Spinoza emerges as a theorist of  
capital and globalization who comes—anachronistically and yet all 
the more poignantly—after Marx.
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Part III takes up the issues discussed in the previous chapters to 
present them in relation to Spinoza’s relevance for the arts. Such an 
unusual approach aims not only to present Spinoza from a novel 
perspective that can be illuminating but in addition to demonstrate 
that Spinoza’s thought can be applied to a variety of  contexts and 
issues of  contemporary relevance.
Sebastian Egenhofer also tackles the Marxist legacy of  Spinoza’s 
thought, concentrating on how the notion of  production is indis-
pensable in understanding the art of  the twentieth century. There 
is an increasing shift from the imagistic to the economic aspect 
of  production—from Mondrian’s abstractions, whose process of  
material production is secondary, to Judd’s minimalism, which 
makes the material manifestation the focal point, to Asher’s works, 
operating with and against their own economic genesis. Egenhofer 
suggests a next stage indicated by the “precarious materiality” of  
Thomas Hirschhorn’s Spinoza Monument. Here the two aspects of  
production are inseparable—or, even more emphatically, they allow 
for the conceptualization of  this inseparability. The work of  art is 
both the experience and the thought that structures that experience. 
In this way, Hirschhorn’s work manifests that the Marxian notion 
of  production unfolds in a Spinozan matrix, as the various ways 
in which the infinite can be expressed in its finite modes. In other 
words, only when the Spinozan link between ontology and politics 
is imbued with the Marxian notion of  production can Hirschhorn’s 
originality come to the fore.
Anthony Uhlmann combines issues discussed in earlier chap-
ters—the theory of  relations in Badiou and Duffy, the notion of  the 
necessity of  a gap in interpretation in Montag, and the concomitance 
of  production and its idea in Egenhofer—to show that it is possible to 
develop a Spinozist understanding of  the arts. Departing from Beck-
ett’s fascination with Spinoza, Uhlmann acknowledges that, at first 
blush, the parallelism between thought and experience, the infinite 
and finite, or substance and its modes poses a problem for art. But 
this is only so if  art is under the sway of  representation. Spinoza, as 
Uhlmann shows, had already moved beyond representation by insist-
ing that the parallelism does not suggest a lack of  contact; rather, 
infinite knowledge is of  necessity related to its finite modes—the 
first kind of  knowledge is implicated in the third kind of  knowledge. 
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This theory of  relations enacts gaps between its different parts. The 
presence of  these gaps is also indispensable for the arts. A work of  
art does not convey a message; rather, a work of  art establishes rela-
tions whose message is the (ethical) imperative to fill the gaps that, 
of  necessity, persist. This means that, just as in Spinoza’s relation of  
substance and its modes, modern art is both the unfolding of  mate-
rial relations and the thinking that accompanies them.
Mieke Bal and Dimitris Vardoulakis explore the relation between 
thought and matter from a different perspective, emphasizing the 
rupture that makes their relation possible. Spinoza addresses this 
by drawing the distinction between essence and existence. As Bal 
and Vardoulakis note, this distinction is drawn with recourse to 
examples from art. This is not accidental. As an analysis of  three 
different versions of  Rembrandt’s depiction of  Joseph, Potiphar, and 
his wife demonstrates, Rembrandt’s work makes possible a similar 
distinction between image and words. The complex interpretations 
that arise when the image is denied an immediate meaning echo 
Spinoza’s insistence that there is no immediate connection between 
thought and matter, essence and existence. From this perspective, 
the link between Rembrandt and Spinoza is not based on the fact 
that they were neighbors in Amsterdam’s Jewish quarter but rather 
is based on adopting a similar attitude to the creation of  art and 
culture. Thus Spinoza emerges not so much as an aesthetician as a 
philosopher whose ontology reverberates with an understanding of  
the arts precisely because the distinction of  essence and existence 
allows for creation and production.
The last three chapters provide encounters between Spinoza and 
other philosophers. These encounters are not primarily compara-
tive analyses, nor are they merely the impetus for exploring current 
philosophical issues; rather all three encounters stage the importance 
of  the Spinozan ontology’s privileging of  life over death.
Antonio Negri begins his analysis by pointing out that modern 
philosophy is characterized by the Hegelian move to unite essence 
and existence. As Bal and Vardoulakis discussed in the previous 
chapter, and as Negri emphasizes here again, essence and existence 
are never united in Spinoza. Negri further observes that Heidegger’s 
ontological difference rests on the same premise. The disjunction 
between essence and existence makes Heidegger and Spinoza both
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antimodernist philosophers, yet here the similarities end, for ulti-
mately they construct contradictory, even antithetical, ontologies. 
Heidegger proposes an ontology of  the void, emphasizing the noth-
ingness of  being, which is achieved through the projective aspect of  
care, the destiny that subjugates being in being-toward-death. This 
is, argues Negri, a totalizing move, whose reactionary political over-
tones are clear to see. Conversely, Spinoza’s ontology understands 
being as plenitude, and instead of  an emptiness, there are relations of  
power. The result is radically different from Heidegger, Negri insists. 
Instead of  the totalizing impulse of  death, we have in Spinoza the 
singularity of  life, which articulates itself  in love, the construction of  
being through affect. This constructive aspect makes the escape from 
destiny through freedom possible and, consequently, is a genuinely 
democratic impulse.
A. Kiarina Kordela shows that the way that death is conceived 
is crucial for Spinoza’s political stance seen from a psychoanalytic 
perspective. For this to come to the fore, argues Kordela, it is im-
portant to avoid two interrelated premises that structure Antonio 
Damasio’s interpretation of  Spinoza. These are, first, that Spinoza 
performs an inversion of  Cartesian dualism by privileging the body 
over the mind, and second, that consequently Spinoza’s is solely a 
philosophy of  life, one that indicates homeostasis, self-preservation, 
and the pleasure principle. Kordela shows that such an inversion of  
Cartesianism only leads to a new dualism—a dualism that can only 
conceive of  death as a biological occurrence. As Kordela demon-
strates, however, death is never solely biological for Spinoza. Instead, 
as the discussions of  suicide evidence, Spinoza’s conception of  
death is indispensable in social and political critique. Thus Spinoza 
emerges as having recourse to the death drive alongside the pleasure 
principle. This political dimension, then, allows Spinoza’s ontology 
to reverberate with psychoanalysis. Like Negri, Kordela shows that 
this dimension emerges in Part V of  the Ethics, in the discussion of  
the intellectual love of  God.
Alexander García Düttmann explores the relation between life 
and death by staging a dialogue between Spinoza and Derrida.
Düttmann begins his chapter with Spinoza’s assertion that a free man 
fears death least of  all. This entails that freedom requires a libera-
tion from the affect of  fear and, more generally, liberation from the 
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bondage of  affect—which also means the attainment of  wisdom. 
In Spinoza’s construal, freedom as an affirmation of  life is nothing 
other than the acceptance of  the law’s necessity—a freeing oneself  
from that necessity even though that necessity persists. Derrida’s no-
tion of  the law is never articulated in terms of  necessity but always 
in terms of  indecision. The absence of  certain or adequate criteria 
precludes any certainty of  the law’s validity. Derrida also sides with 
life, but here life is understood as the infinite deferral of  the law, as 
the suspension of  its necessity. From that perspective, the Spinozan 
position about freedom being the acceptance of  the necessity of  the 
law appears thoroughly incompatible with Derrida. Yet the matter 
is not as simple as that. For though Derrida can refute Spinoza on 
the grounds that it is merely idealism to impute the liberation over 
affect—that is, to tame being or reality by subsuming it to the law of  
the substance—still Spinoza can respond that Derrida’s own asser-
tion of  the impossibility of  grasping necessity can be conceived as 
a law in itself, as the ultimate affirmation of  necessity. Despite their 
differences, their mutual affirmation of  life makes it at least possible 
for them to say that they understand each other.
Janouch mentions the following comment that Franz Kaf ka made 
to him:
“Accident is the name one gives to the coincidence of  events, of  
which one does not know the causation. But there is no world 
without causation. Therefore in the world there are no accidents, 
but only here . . .” Kaf ka touched his forehead with his left hand. 
“Accidents only exist in our heads, in our limited perceptions. They 
are the reflection of  the limits of  our knowledge. The struggle 
against chance is always a struggle against ourselves, which we 
can never entirely win.”19
Kaf ka unwittingly expresses himself  as a true Spinozist here. There 
is, on one hand, an unshakeable necessity. However, on the other 
hand, that necessity is not subject to a law, or at least to a law 
that can be discovered. This necessity persists despite us—and yet, 
simultaneously, it can exist only because of  us, because of  our 
struggles to bridge the gap that separates us from that necessity. 
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The insistence on the now in Spinoza’s philosophy is about this gap 
and this struggle. Their effects are so deep that they bring disparate 
categories into contact, from ontology to politics and from ethics 
to aesthetics. What has to be remembered, however, is that the gap 
can never be filled, the struggle can never completely succeed or, 
in Kaf ka’s words, “we can never entirely win.” This must apply to 
Spinoza himself. Thus “Spinoza now” is not so much a statement 
about a truth that Spinoza’s writings can reveal to us in our present 
situation; rather, it is the injunction to adhere to the attitude that 
affirms both necessity and its impossibility. It is hoped that this will 
lead to an engaged thought that strives to rediscover that struggle 
in the past and to ensure that it continues in the future.
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